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Abstract 
Through a comparative, longitudinal analysis of the wine industry in two Argentine provinces, 
this article examines how different political approaches to reform shape the ability of societies to 
build new institutions for economic upgrading.  The article finds that inherited structural factors 
per se can not easily explain the different solutions to this challenge.  A better explanation 
focuses on how governments confront the dual challenge of redefining the boundary between the 
public and private domains and of recombining the socio-economic ties among relevant firms 
and their respective business associations.  A “depoliticization” approach emphasizes the 
imposition of arm’s-length incentives by a powerful, insulated government, but appears to 
contribute little to institutional change and upgrading.  A “participatory restructuring” approach 
promotes the creation of public-private institutions via adherence to two key principles: a) 
inclusion of a wide variety of relevant stakeholder groups and b) rules of deliberative governance 
that promote collective problem-solving.  This latter approach appears to have the advantage of 
facilitating collaboration and knowledge creation among previously antagonistic groups, 
including government. 
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Non-technical Summary 
Scholars of economic development increasingly argue that growth and international 
competitiveness depend on the ability of a society to upgrade its firms and industries – a shift 
from lower- to higher-value economic activities by using local innovative capacities to make 
continuous improvements in processes, products, and functions (Doner, Ritchie, & Slater, 2005; 
Giuliani, Pietrobelli, & Rabellotti, 2005b).  The attendant creation and diffusion of skills and 
knowledge relies on collective resources and coordination.  In turn, innovative capacities depend 
not simply on the presence of foreign investors but especially on particular local constellations of 
inter-firm networks, institutions, and state capacities.
1  Yet as is evident in current debates about 
the origins and change in institutions (Campbell, 2004; Greif & Laitin, 2004; Mahoney & 
Rueschemeyer, 2003), the developmental state (Doner et al., 2005; O'Riain, 2004), clusters 
(Perez-Aleman, 2005; Schmitz, 2004b), and socio-economic networks (Adler & Kwon, 2002; 
Ansell, 2000; Kogut, 2000; Padgett, 2001; Powell, 2002), it is less clear how public and private 
actors forge innovative capacities in the first place.  This is particularly distressing for regions 
like Latin America, where the history of failed development and backwardness points to a lack of 
the requisite social and institutional preconditions.  (Haber, 2002; Levitsky & Murillo, 
forthcoming; Pack, 2000) 
 
  Analysis of the Argentine wine sector may be especially helpful here.  On the one hand, 
Argentina is typically known for its dysfunctional social capital and political-economic 
institutions (Levitsky et al., forthcoming; Ross Schneider, 2004), and its wine industry has a long 
history of backwardness and virtually no international presence.  On the other hand, the 
Argentine wine sector witnessed a turnaround in the 1990s and now accounts for more than 2% 
of the over $12 billion global wine market.  In particular, the divergent upgrading paths of the 
dominant, neighboring winemaking provinces of Mendoza and San Juan offers a unique 
opportunity to use a longitudinal, subnational comparative analysis to evaluate the determinants 
of more or less successful attempts to create new innovative capacities. (Schmitz and Nadvi 
1999; Snyder 2001, Montero 2001)  Mendoza has captured the disproportionate share of exports 
by building in the 1990s a new constellation of institutions and networks that support sustained 
improvements in processes and products in a wide variety of firms.  In contrast, San Juan has 
been a laggard in upgrading its wine and grapes, despite advancing policies that did usher in 
large amounts of new investment.  Moreover, the institutional model pioneered by Mendoza is 
being replicated at the national level.  In 2004, the Argentine congress and president signed into 
law a strategic wine sector policy that is self-financing and is governed by a non-state body 
comprised of representatives from relevant business associations, research institutions, and 
provincial and federal ministries.  This policy and governance structure are arguably without 
precedent in a country known for the executive imposing protectionist policies that end up 
draining the budget and benefiting a few elites. (Guillen, 2001; Ross Schneider, 2004)  
 
  What types of institutional innovations contributed to the upgrading in Mendoza? How 
did the policymaking process in Mendoza enable public and private actors to build these new 
institutions and networks in the 1990s, when they were unable previously and while those in San 
Juan could not? 
   3
  This article argues that changes in upgrading and institutions are not wholly determined 
by pre-existing conditions or by the sudden implantation of new rules or incentives.  Rather, 
different political approaches to reform, especially during crises, can facilitate or impede the 
construction of new public-private institutions that underpin upgrading and the recombination of 
socio-economic ties between previously antagonistic groups.  Political approaches to reform are 
prior to and broader than particular policies.  They are strategies governments use to construct 
political power that define the mechanisms linking the functioning and substance of institutions 
with policymaking coalitions. (Jacoby, 2000; Thelen, 2003) In this view, upgrading and 
institutional change are incremental processes, in which the relevant firms, associations, and 
public actors jointly experiment with new roles and rules.  In identifying the basic spectrum of 
political approaches to reform, this article aims to clarify the governance conditions that can help 
initiate and sustain these experiments. 
 
  During crises, governments have the political space to overcome past socio-political 
constraints by formulating a strategy to confront the dual challenge of reconstructing the 
boundary between the public and private domains and recombining the relative power and social 
ties among firms and their associations. (Ross Schneider, 2004; Snyder, 2001) On the one hand, 
a government may choose what I call a “depoliticization” approach, which aims to insulate 
centralized policymaking and quickly impose new rules based on high powered economic 
incentives.  On the other hand, a government may choose what I call a “participatory 
restructuring” approach which aims to embed the state and policymaking in society in new ways 
(Evans 2004, Hirst 1994, Montero 2001, Sabel 1994).  This approach rests on two key principles 
of empowered participatory governance (Fung & Wright, 2001):  1) empowering a variety of 
public agencies and socio-economic groups to participate in institution-building; and 2) requiring 
participants to share private information in ways that induce collective problem solving and 
mutual monitoring.  The former approach may initially stimulate investment but will tend to 
impede upgrading and keep the past disproportionate distribution of resources.  The latter 
approach can bring together previously disparate and even antagonistic groups in new ways so as 
to foster collective learning and monitoring and thus new public-private institutions supportive of 
upgrading. 
 
  The article develops these arguments through a longitudinal, comparative analysis of the 
wine industry and relevant public policies of the aforementioned provinces during the 1990s.  
Such a comparison allows one to control for typical ex ante, structural explanatory variables, 
such as legal institutions, electoral rules, social capital, climate, and industry impact.  Moreover, 
the analysis uses unique board and membership data to construct a UCINET model that 
demonstrates how the new public-private institutions help, first and foremost, bridge social and 
cognitive divides between relevant socio-economic groups and the provincial government. 
   4
Introduction 
Scholars of economic development increasingly argue that growth and international 
competitiveness depend on the ability of a society to upgrade its firms and industries – a shift 
from lower- to higher-value economic activities by using local innovative capacities to make 
continuous improvements in processes, products, and functions (Doner, Ritchie, & Slater, 2005; 
Giuliani, Pietrobelli, & Rabellotti, 2005b).  The attendant creation and diffusion of skills and 
knowledge relies on collective resources and coordination.  In turn, innovative capacities depend 
not simply on the presence of foreign investors but especially on particular local constellations of 
inter-firm networks, institutions, and state capacities.
2  Yet as is evident in current debates about 
the origins and change in institutions (Campbell, 2004; Greif & Laitin, 2004; Mahoney & 
Rueschemeyer, 2003), the developmental state (Doner et al., 2005; O'Riain, 2004), clusters 
(Perez-Aleman, 2005; Schmitz, 2004b), and socio-economic networks (Adler & Kwon, 2002; 
Ansell, 2000; Kogut, 2000; Padgett, 2001; Powell, 2002), it is less clear how public and private 
actors forge innovative capacities in the first place.  This is particularly distressing for regions 
like Latin America, where the history of failed development and backwardness points to a lack of 
the requisite social and institutional preconditions.  (Haber, 2002; Levitsky & Murillo, 
forthcoming; Pack, 2000) 
  Analysis of the Argentine wine sector may be especially helpful here.  On the one hand, 
Argentina is typically known for its dysfunctional social capital and political-economic 
institutions (Levitsky et al., forthcoming; Ross Schneider, 2004), and its wine industry has a long 
history of backwardness and virtually no international presence.  On the other hand, the 
Argentine wine sector witnessed a turnaround in the 1990s and now accounts for more than 2% 
of the over $12 billion global wine market.  In particular, the divergent upgrading paths of the 
dominant, neighboring winemaking provinces of Mendoza and San Juan offers a unique   5
opportunity to use a longitudinal, subnational comparative analysis to evaluate the determinants 
of more or less successful attempts to create new innovative capacities. (Schmitz and Nadvi 
1999; Snyder 2001, Montero 2001)  Mendoza has captured the disproportionate share of exports 
by building in the 1990s a new constellation of institutions and networks that support sustained 
improvements in processes and products in a wide variety of firms.  In contrast, San Juan has 
been a laggard in upgrading its wine and grapes, despite advancing policies that did usher in 
large amounts of new investment.  Moreover, the institutional model pioneered by Mendoza is 
being replicated at the national level.  In 2004, the Argentine congress and president signed into 
law a strategic wine sector policy that is self-financing and is governed by a non-state body 
comprised of representatives from relevant business associations, research institutions, and 
provincial and federal ministries.  This policy and governance structure are arguably without 
precedent in a country known for the executive imposing protectionist policies that end up 
draining the budget and benefiting a few elites. (Guillen, 2001; Ross Schneider, 2004)  
  What types of institutional innovations contributed to the upgrading in Mendoza? How 
did the policymaking process in Mendoza enable public and private actors to build these new 
institutions and networks in the 1990s, when they were unable previously and while those in San 
Juan could not? 
  This article argues that changes in upgrading and institutions are not wholly determined 
by pre-existing conditions or by the sudden implantation of new rules or incentives.  Rather, 
different political approaches to reform, especially during crises, can facilitate or impede the 
construction of new public-private institutions that underpin upgrading and the recombination of 
socio-economic ties between previously antagonistic groups.  Political approaches to reform are 
prior to and broader than particular policies.  They are strategies governments use to construct   6
political power that define the mechanisms linking the functioning and substance of institutions 
with policymaking coalitions. (Jacoby, 2000; Thelen, 2003) In this view, upgrading and 
institutional change are incremental processes, in which the relevant firms, associations, and 
public actors jointly experiment with new roles and rules.  In identifying the basic spectrum of 
political approaches to reform, this article aims to clarify the governance conditions that can help 
initiate and sustain these experiments. 
  During crises, governments have the political space to overcome past socio-political 
constraints by formulating a strategy to confront the dual challenge of reconstructing the 
boundary between the public and private domains and recombining the relative power and social 
ties among firms and their associations. (Ross Schneider, 2004; Snyder, 2001) On the one hand, 
a government may choose what I call a “depoliticization” approach, which aims to insulate 
centralized policymaking and quickly impose new rules based on high powered economic 
incentives.  On the other hand, a government may choose what I call a “participatory 
restructuring” approach which aims to embed the state and policymaking in society in new ways 
(Evans 2004, Hirst 1994, Montero 2001, Sabel 1994).  This approach rests on two key principles 
of empowered participatory governance (Fung & Wright, 2001) :1) empowering a variety of 
public agencies and socio-economic groups to participate in institution-building; and 2) requiring 
participants to share private information in ways that induce collective problem solving and 
mutual monitoring.  The former approach may initially stimulate investment but will tend to 
impede upgrading and keep the past disproportionate distribution of resources.  The latter 
approach can bring together previously disparate and even antagonistic groups in new ways so as 
to foster collective learning and monitoring and thus new public-private institutions supportive of 
upgrading.   7
  Section I lays out the theoretical underpinnings of this argument.  Section II reviews 
upgrading in the Argentine wine industry.  In the 1990s, Mendoza appears to have initiated and 
sustained coordinated, decentralized product and process experiments across a wide variety of 
firms, micro-climates, and products.  Section III argues that the divergent outcomes in San Juan 
and Mendoza can not be explained alone by inherited structural variables, such as soils, climates, 
industrial and social structures, macro-economic conditions, legal regimes, strength of political 
executive, and political party affiliation.  In particular, the evidence suggests that inherited social 
and professional ties alone may help initiate new forms of collective learning, but their 
exclusionary principles can also thwart broad-based upgrading and collective action due to the 
diversity of interests, historical animosity, and resource inequalities between regions within a 
province.  Section IV analyzes the different political approaches by the governments of the two 
provinces in confronting the general economic turbulence and growing crisis in wine sector in 
the late 1980s.  It shows how Mendoza’s participatory restructuring approach to building new 
public-private institutions helped over come these conflicts by recombining the ties among 
diverse groups and fostering collective problem-solving.
3 
I.  Linking the Macro and the Micro for Change and Growth 
There are two broad views about the social and political forces that shape the development of 
new inter-organizational networks and institutions supporting innovative capacities.  The “top 
down” view understands change as epochal.  During periods of crisis, governments have the 
political space to insulate a strong, coherent policymaking apparatus from particularistic interests 
to design and impose rapidly a new set of rules and institutions on society.  Whether one 
emphasizes rapid market liberalization and private property rights or strategic interventions into 
industries, the new rules are based largely on high powered economic incentives that will guide   8
domestic and foreign firms to make the necessary investments into new technologies and 
capabilities.   (Amsden, 1989; Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1995; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995)   
  In contrast, the “bottom up” view emphasizes the continuity of social forces and is 
suspicious of the interventions and rules suddenly imposed from the commanding heights.   
Economic activity is mediated by and embedded in networks and associations that embody 
distinct sets of social ties, norms, reputations, and resources.  Scholars may argue about whether 
the origins and reproduction of these properties are rooted in repeated interactions among 
individuals facing common externalities (Ostrom, 1990), deep traditions of civic mindedness and 
kinship (Putnam et al., 1993), or past socio-political conflicts (Schneider 2004; Padgett 2001).  
But they share the view that these properties are enduring and that, at the limit, the public rules, 
policies, and institutions are essentially the formal manifestations of the attendant social norms 
and structure.  Government receives and enforces the game but rarely defines it autonomously.  
  These literatures have certainly improved our understanding of the conditions for growth 
and innovation.  However, their apparent incompatibilities they reveal some common 
weaknesses.  First, to the extent that development in general and institution building in particular 
relies on the insulation of the executive and a team of technocrats, then the lack of information 
and knowledge flows between groups of policymakers and recipients not only can breed self-
dealing and “monocropping,” but also can destroy social and human capital (Evans, 2004; 
McDermott, 2002a, 2002b; Ostrom, 1995).  Second, many of the received accounts of social 
structure and institutions tend reify interests and social groups in such ways as make them 
functional, binary, and immutable to change. (Granovetter, 1985)  Third, although a society may 
contain a plethora of, say, professional associations, the attendant social ties and norms that can 
ground collaboration and collective learning can also be self-limiting and exclusionary.  To the   9
extent that these groups have different needs and resources, are relatively isolated, and are not 
incorporated into more encompassing institutions, a diverse socio-economic environment can 
easily produce a balkanized society that thwarts broad-based innovation, knowledge diffusion, 
and institutional change. (Ostrom 1999, Safford 2004, Schneider 2004, Adler 2001)  
  These criticisms highlight that optimal incentives or the inherited structure of the state, 
electoral rules, and socio-economic groups may be indeterminate in clarifying how public and 
private actors forge new organizational and institutional forms to promote innovative capacities 
even during crises, particularly when a society has a long history of dysfunctional social 
structures and political-economic institutions.  In order to begin to capture the interaction of 
continuity and change, one must first clarify the political approaches toward reform that can both 
redefine the boundary between the public and private domains and recombine the ties and 
resources of relevant socio-economic groups. This article aims to specify the spectrum of these 
approaches and their mechanisms for inducing and sustaining change.  These specifications can 
provide the conceptual links between the broader socio-political trends of a society and the 
upgrading outcomes.  
  The first insight toward filling this gap comes from research that emphasizes the public-
private nature of upgrading institutions and the ways in which they help embed the state and 
constituent business associations in a constellation of horizontal governance and professional ties 
(Evans 1995, Schmitz 2004, Montero 2002, Perez-Aleman 2000).  While market failures may 
require government intervention, uncertainty and informational asymmetries make unclear just 
what new rule or initiative is applicable (Evans, 2004; Jacoby, 2000; Ostrom, 1999).  For 
instance, Rodrik (2004) has aptly noted that “the task of industrial policy is as much about 
eliciting information from the private sector on significant externalities and their remedies as it is   10
about implementing appropriate policies.”  Rodrik’s point is based on the understanding that 
policymaking and institution building are not one time events but rather experimental, 
demanding continual information and knowledge exchange between the superiors and 
subordinates, between policymakers and their constituents. (Sabel 1994)   
  But opening up the policymaking process can easily result in capture by the existing 
privileged groups, which can restrict the diversity of information and interests and sow the seeds 
of self-dealing.  To avoid these outcomes, political approaches to reform would have to include 
two criteria: economic and political empowerment of a variety, especially marginalized, groups 
and rules of governance that sustain collective-problem solving.  First, research on Latin 
American political economy shows that even resource constrained governments can break the 
status quo by granting a variety of associations and cooperatives new access to public resources 
and policymaking. (Schneider 2004, Snyder 2001, Tendler 1997)  In particular, the combination 
of incentives for firms to channel their demands via their collective organizations and of rules of 
inclusive participation in the formation of new institutions and programs can create new social 
and professional ties among previously isolated, even antagonistic socio-economic groups and 
the state.  (Burt 2000; Padgett and Ansell 1993; Stark and Bruszt 1998) Such a process of 
recombination can allow the relevant public and private actors to access new knowledge, 
resources, and partners, improve mutual monitoring, and induce a greater variety of firm and 
policy experiments. (Cohen & Rogers, 1992; Locke, 1995; Ross Schneider, 2004; Safford, 2004)  
Second, in return for membership, participants adhere to governance rules of deliberation 
and collective problem solving, while non-state participants may gradually increase their 
material contribution to the institution.  Deliberation is the iterative process by which the 
participants jointly define objectives, evaluate results, and decide on the next measures to be   11
taken by the nascent institutions.  (Baiocchi 2001; Fung and Wright 2001)  As participants 
attempt to justify their interests and opinions, they increasingly reveal private information to one 
another.  The public and private actors can then better assess one another’s actions, the needed 
changes in services, and the terms under which they may increase their resource contributions.  
Access to and contributions of resources may act as incentives, but the participatory governance 
style provides direct feed-back loops, increases information flows, and builds confidence.   
Scholars from Ostrom (1999) to Culpepper (2004) to Sabel (1994; 1996a) have shown how 
collective problem-solving via deliberation is the substantive occasion in which previously 
antagonistic groups and individuals can begin to identify points of common interest, 
compromise, and effectively learn how to monitor one another. Moreover, research on collective 
problem solving at both firm and policymaking levels has been shown to enhance learning, the 
exchange of tacit knowledge, and the creation of new strategies and capabilities.  (Helper, 
MacDuffie, & Sabel, 2000; MacDuffie, 1997; McEvily, 2005; Winter, 2003)  As participating 
associations and their constituent firms see the benefits of collaboration through the institutions, 
they are likely to build broader strategic considerations on top of their past rent-seeking instincts. 
(Berk & Schneiberg, 2005; Doner, 2000; Hirst, 1994; Stark & Bruszt, 1998) 
  The cumulative term I give to these conditions is “participatory restructuring.”  I argue 
that one can explain the divergent paths of upgrading in Mendoza and San Juan by whether the 
governments pursue participatory restructuring or the contrasting depoliticization approaches to 
reform in the face of common crises.  Participatory restructuring approaches enable societies to 
break out of low equilibrium paths and build new innovative capacities at both public and private 
levels when relevant services and programs are delivered through public-private institutions.  
Effective creation of these institutions occurs: 1) when reforms to resolving crises are used to   12
reshape the information and resource asymmetries among relevant firms and their attendant 
associations and cooperatives; and 2) when participation by relevant public and private actors is 
guided by rules of inclusive membership and of deliberation that induce collective problem 
solving.  In contrast, depoliticization approaches attempt to insulate policymaking from society 
and induce change by imposing new rules based on arm’s length economic incentives.  This 
approach may foster new capital investment by firms but not upgrading, and indeed the benefits 
of such an approach will likely accrue to existing privileged elites. 
  In this view, the structure of prior social, political, and economic resources can constrain 
upgrading initiatives.  Building new innovative capacities for upgrading begins not simply 
providing public goods. Rather, it begins with the government incorporating a wide variety of 
relevant socio-economic groups to develop together new institutional solutions to crises in such 
ways that focus on recombining the substantive and structural ties among these groups and the 
state itself.  (Hirst 1994)  
II. The Transformation of the Argentine Wine Industry and the Challenge of Upgrading 
  “Can Argentina fulfill its potential and produce world-class wines?  The answer is an 
  emphatic yes.”  Wine Spectator, March 24, 2003.  
 
  Argentina is historically one of the largest volume producers and per capita consumers of 
wine in the world, but production focused on low-quality wine and grapes for the domestic 
market.  Through the 1980s, the industry suffered under hyperinflation, negative growth, and 
heavy regulations, such as price controls and output quotas, which led to such perverse strategies 
as the eradication of potentially high value grapes, like 30% of the stock of Malbec (Giuliani & 
Bell, 2005a; Walters, 1999).  Both Mendoza and San Juan had a few large firms, several hundred 
small and medium size wineries, and thousands of small grape producers, which were often 
propped up by each province’s state owned winery.  The old regulations were rapidly eliminated   13
in 1990, as the administration of President Carlos Menem (1989-99) implemented pro-market 
reforms in Argentina. Price and trade liberalization, privatization, and a currency board 
supporting an overvalued Peso ushered in a decade of low inflation, a sudden increase in FDI, 
and volatile growth.  Argentine manufacturing, however, shifted away from higher value-added 
production as it did not export much or focused on the less sophisticated Mercosur markets.
4   
  In contrast, the Argentine wine sector, though still very dependent on domestic sales, 
underwent a profound transformation in the 1990s.  Wine exports grew from a few million 
dollars in 1990 to 1.5% of the world market even at the height of Peso overvaluation to over 2% 
of the world market (including 3% of the highly competitive UK market) or over $480 million in 
2004, growing at an average annual rate of about 23%.
5   
  These gains came not only from comparative costs, but especially from consistent 
advancements in product quality and innovation.  First, Argentine vineyards gradually improved 
the quality of grapes (“70% of the wine’s value is in the grape”).  Varieties of high enological 
value vastly increased their shares of vine surface area – from about 20% in 1990 to about 43% 
in 2001 (Cetrangolo et al., 2002)  Second, wine quality improved.  As Figures 1a & b show, by 
the mid-1990s the vast majority of export revenues came from fine wines (now 85%), as opposed 
to cheap table wine.  Over 70% of Argentine wine exports are sold in the United States, EU, and 
Japan, hence sophisticated, competitive markets.  By the end of the 1990s, an increased number 
of Argentine wines were being rated by such elite wine magazines as Wine Spectator, and were 
receiving as a group ever better scores, even when compared to better known Chilean wines (see 
Table 1 and Figure 2).   At the same time, average export prices per bottle dramatically increased 
to just 30 cents less than the Chilean average.  Third, with the world market for the standard 
“fighting four varietals” (cabernet, merlot, sauvignon blanc, and chardonnay) virtually saturated,   14
the Argentine firms focused on producing a greater variety of new products, such as previously 
undervalued varietals (e.g., Malbec, Torrontes), “redesigned” varietals from other specialized 
regions of the world (e.g., Tempranillo, Bonarda), and distinctive blends.
6 
  This shift demanded new capabilities in coordinating multiple, continuous process and 
product experiments across a variety of organizations and micro-climates.  Increased wine value 
begins not simply with the adoption of new hard technology and fertilizers or with market and 
distribution but namely with transforming the middle and upstream segments of the value chain: 
state-of-the-art quality control and product development running from vine planting to careful 
vineyard maintenance to flawless harvests to vinification and blending.  Enologists work closely 
with agronomists and growers to introduce and experiment with new modes of growing, pruning, 
sanitizing, and watering with new and old varietals and clones of grapes.  They then test, for 
instance, different types of indigenous yeasts and enzymes as well as methods of refrigeration, 
processing, and storage to optimally ferment the wine and elicit the grape’s flavors and aromas.  
Similar to co-design and co-benchmarking processes used in complex manufacturing (Helper et 
al., 2000; Kogut, 2000), these actors develop new systems to carefully document practices and 
products, share the information, and evaluate the results over time and space. Because of the 
variation in climates, soils, varietals and clones, experimentation is contextualized, knowledge is 
often tacit, and dissemination is necessarily social and interactive, often demanding a complex 
network of vertical and horizontal ties among firms. (Giuliani et al., 2005a; Henderson, Pagani, 
& Cool, 2004; Roberts & Ingram, 2002; Walters, 1999)  Moreover, upgrading is highly time-
consuming – any new vine takes 2-3 years to yield testable results and any quality and taste 
modification to grape growing take 18-24 months.     15
  This gradual, multiparty process of upgrading in Argentina has occurred in the 1990s 
across a wide variety of grape growing conditions, varietals, and firm strategies.  Mendoza and 
San Juan have about 100 micro-climates with the potential to support at least 12 red and white 
varietals of medium and high value (Cetrangolo et al 2002).  Grape production remained rather 
decentralized across relatively small plots, even after some consolidation and a significant 
decline in the number of vineyards and in total vineyard surface area in the 1980s and 1990s.
7  
By 2001, Mendoza still had over 16,000 vineyards totaling about 140,000 hectares and San Juan 
had over 6000 vineyards totaling about 50,000 hectares. According to the agricultural survey of 
the Mendoza for 2003, the largest 18 vineyard owners controlled only 5% of surface area 
dedicated to grape growing for wine and about 1100 owners controlled about 50%.  Indeed, 
despite the asset specific nature of grape development, subcontracting has actually increased 
from about 50% of a winery’s grape needs in the 1980s to almost 70% by 2000. (Cetrangolo et 
al., 2002)   In contrast, in Chile the fighting four varietals historically accounted for about half of 
the vineyards, and much of the upgrading and exports in the 1980s was dominated by less than a 
dozen large, vertically integrated firms.
8  
  The relatively high variety of firm strategies and organizational forms is further reflected 
at the level of the winery.
9  During the 1990s, the number of registered and active wineries in the 
Mendoza and San Juan dropped by about 35% and since 2000 gradually rose.  Today there are 
683 active wineries in Mendoza and 169 in San Juan.  As of 2003, there were about 200 firms 
that export wine, with the top five firms accounting for about 40% of total wine export sales and 
the top 20 for about 70%.  No firms are publicly listed, most are small and medium sized family 
firms and partnerships, about 10% are cooperatives, and very few are controlled by Argentine 
business groups or foreign investors.
10  Indeed, foreign investors control less than half of the 30   16
top exporters, and though estimates vary greatly, it appears that FDI accounts for about half of 
the $1-1.5 billion invested in the wine industry in Argentina between 1991 and 2003, with most 
coming after 1996.  The seven companies that account for 80% of cheap table wine have also 
diversified in economically priced fine wine. Two are prominent cooperatives, which have 20-35 
member firms and draw on a few thousand small grape suppliers. The approximately 50 
premium wineries that account for about 45% of fine wine volume and 70% of fine wine exports 
had previously focused on cheap table wine but now have products that fetch a US retail price 
per bottle ranging from $5 to $40.  They have their own vineyards but also together depend on 
about 3000 grape suppliers.  The number of grape suppliers used per winery varies widely, from 
boutique wineries with about 10 specialized suppliers each to the largest diversified wineries 
with about 200-300 non-exclusive suppliers each.    
  These advances in wine and grape upgrading have, however, been much more profound 
and broad based in Mendoza than in San Juan, despite the similar climatic conditions and soil 
qualities (Cetrangolo et al. 2002), and even the greater importance of winemaking to the latter’s 
economy.  Table 2a shows the relevant wine and grape production and export data.  For instance, 
Mendoza accounts for a highly disproportional share of Argentina’s wine exports.  As of 2002, 
65% of the Mendoza harvest and 26% of the San Juan harvest were classified as comprised of 
high and medium quality grapes.   Moreover, upgrading has spread to large zones of Mendoza, 
like the Zona Este (about 50% of Mendoza’s vine surface area), that were historically considered 
backward and capable of producing only poor quality wines and grapes.  The surface area share 
of high and medium enological value gapes/vines in the Zona Este vineyards increased to about 
26% of its total by 1998 and to over 37% by 2001.  By 2003, about 55% of Zona Este wineries   17
had modern quality control systems and also accounted for almost a third of those exporting 
from Mendoza.
11  
III. Mendoza vs. San Juan – Inherited Resources as Indeterminate to Upgrading 
Mendoza appears to have promoted broad-based upgrading often by taking advantage of and not 
simply being paralyzed by a wide variety of firms, interests, micro-climates, and products.  But 
how can one explain its ability to initiate and sustain the attendant coordination and knowledge 
creation in the 1990s, when it could not previously and while San Juan stalled and became such a 
laggard? There are three main explanations that focus on the importance of legal and inherited 
socio-economic resources. (See also Table 2b.) 
  One could argue that Mendoza had better legal institutions.  However, both provinces are 
subject to the same national system of commercial law and property rights, which are not strong 
by international standards and which appear to be at times less secure in Mendoza than in San 
Juan.
12  The wine industry has been subject to largely the same national and regional regulatory 
laws, including a 1993 agreement by the two provinces on regulating the volatility of grape 
prices.  Contracts are also rarely used among wineries and grape growers in both provinces 
(Cetrangolo et. al. 2002).  
    A second explanation would be that Mendoza entered the 1990s with a greater stock of 
human and knowledge resources, such as well trained and connected industry elites (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Ziegler, 1995).  Mendoza did not have a relatively large number of licensed 
enologists, and the one program in the region (Facultad de Enologia Don Bosco in Mendoza) 
annually graduated no more than five enologists who were employed in both provinces.   
(Walters 1999)  But many of the first upgrading initiatives in Mendoza came from firms in the 
best climatic zone (Zona  Primera) that were led by Argentines with foreign education and   18
contacts with well known foreign consultants. While knowledgeable international equipment and 
chemical suppliers flooded both provinces after liberalization in 1989-90, such firms as the 
French owned Chandon and the domestically owned Catena, Trapiche, and Arizu began the 
reorganization of wine production, vineyard maintenance, and bottling in accordance with world 
standards.  Moreover, since relatively few firms in Mendoza had the resources to hire globe 
trotting consultants, these elite firms of the Zona Primera became sources of knowledge as they 
developed systems of incentives and personalized technical assistance to extend process and 
product upgrading to their grape suppliers. (Foster 1995, Walters 1999, pp. 111-114)   
  But the diffusion and application of “best practices” was hampered not only because of 
the experimental nature of upgrading but also because of the variation in climates, soils, 
irrigation, and pests.  What may work in one part of the world, or one part of a province, may not 
be applicable in another place, even for the same varietal or clone.  For instance, in the mid and 
late 1990s, several leading winemakers advised many of their suppliers to incorporate new water 
reduction grape growing methods from abroad.  These had devastating consequences, since the 
method under local climate conditions “cooked” the grapes.  The growers bore almost all of the 
losses themselves.
13  Several firms also acquired large amounts of debilitating debt in the 1990s 
because of overly ambitious technology acquisitions based on advice and cheap financing of the 
international equipment suppliers. (Walters 1999)  In turn, diversity combined with uncertainty 
can impede knowledge diffusion and coordination via markets.  As attempts at quick imitation 
lead to dead-ends and multiple failures, nascent collaboration across firms can easily die on the 
vine, so to speak. (Evans, 2004; Stark, 2001)   
  A third set of explanations would argue that Mendoza had already a superior stock and 
structure of social capital and associationalism that could mediate complex coordination under   19
uncertainty.  However, the conventional reasoning falls short.  First, the stock argument appears 
indeterminate, since, as shown in Table 2b, both provinces have about the same number per 1000 
inhabitants and indeed San Juan had more cooperatives in agriculture (slightly less in general).  
Second, it is unclear in these cases whether the presence of a strong encompassing business 
association necessarily improves policy coordination and coherence (Ross Schneider, 2004).   
San Juan and Mendoza have similar structures of business interests, with several sectoral and 
peak-level business associations.
14   They also had similar histories through the 1980s, with their 
winemaker associations and peak-level associations battling for access to their respective 
provincial governments to play a zero-sum game over price supports and subsidies. (Paladino & 
Jauregui, 2001; Rofman, 1999) 
  This is not to say that the social fabric and structure of associations are unimportant 
variables.  Existing social and professional experiences can be the basis of new forms of 
concerted, collective action (McDermott, 2002a; Sabel, 1996b; Stark, 1996).  For instance, the 
elite firms of Mendoza’s Primera Zona, including those mentioned above, began organizing two 
main voluntary forms of collective learning based on past professional and local ties.  First, elite 
firms created  a few learning groups (CREA), each of which included 8-10 firms that shared the 
cost of a consultant and met regularly to share tacit knowledge and help solve common problems 
of upgrading vineyards.
15  Second, they also began organizing annual wine and label evaluation 
competitions, in which wineries presented their products for review and prizes.  (Paladino et al., 
2001; Walters, 1999) The most noteworthy was EVICO, the wine evaluation event created in 
1990 by the association for enologists (CLEIF), the association of the most prestigious wineries 
(Bodegas de Argentina AC), and the Facultad de Enologia Don Bosco.  A panel of widely 
respected enologists benchmarked the year’s harvest and the wines as well as provided   20
constructive advice on improving the wines during and after processing.   In the late 1990s, 
winemakers and their associations from the historically more backward and less climatic 
advantageous zones of Mendoza and San Juan began organizing similar events.
16   These events 
helped spur debates about the direction of the industry and accelerate the sharing of tacit 
knowledge, as actors from firms, associations, and educational and public institutions began to 
see the benefits of gradual collaboration and the suspension of their old institutional identities.  
As Walters notes (1999, p. 152), “[They] helped shift the focus of attention of former rent-
seeking wine business associations, now far more involved in the discussion of quality and 
production issues.”  
  Nonetheless, these experiences also demonstrated their limitations in bridging the social 
and economic gaps between sub-regions of Mendoza.  Regional discrimination and antagonisms 
limited the interaction of wineries and grape growers from the different Zonas, and thus the 
creation and diffusion of new knowledge.  EVICO and the Grupos CREA were largely limited to 
the most elite wineries of the Primera Zona that viewed the other Zonas as incapable producing 
fine varietals because of their apparent substandard economic, educational, and climate 
conditions.  At the same time, winemakers of these Zonas saw little to gain from those who 
always criticized their products and from discussions not focused on improving the kind of 
intermediate and low enological quality grapes that composed their wine supply chains.  (Walters 
1999, p.151-152) As a result, few took little notice of the efforts of innovators such as La 
Agricola’s Rodolfo Montenegro from the Zona Este.  Rather than replacing old systems with 
newly imported ones, he adapted the “antiquated” the high-yield orthogonal vine training 
systems (parrales) to produce high and intermediate quality grapes at higher than average yields, 
in turn innovating in both quality and cost.  As Montenegro noted in the mid-1990s, “Most of the   21
elite firms and their enologists in Mendoza are still focused too much on the Primer Zona, 
ignoring the productive potential of the areas like Eastern Mendoza.  There is still a lot of 
arrogance” (Walters1999, p. 123).  
  In many ways, this dual nature of social structure – being both facilitating and 
exclusionary, reflects the research of Locke (1994), Cohen and Rogers (1992), Padgett (2001) 
Safford (2004), and Schneider (2004) on other regions and industries.  The need for ever more 
specific knowledge and skills, coupled with traditional rivalries, identities, and resource 
inequalities, can create barriers to the processes of aggregation and joint action that are vital for a 
broader sustainable base of innovation. If more encompassing structures are not historically or 
organically given, then government could help create them. (Ostrom 1999; Schneider 2004) 
IV. Politics and the Emergence of Public-Private Institutions 
Notice that the challenge of coordination and knowledge diffusion becomes a socio-political 
problem beyond simply redirecting public spending.  Creating institutional resources that help 
coordinate decentralized experiments and develop upgrading capabilities is simultaneous to 
reshaping the relative power and relationships among government agencies and socio-economic 
groups or associations.  However, it may not be sufficient to rely on inherited political incentives 
to explain how these institutions emerged in the 1990s in Mendoza and not in San Juan.  Some 
might argue that an executive with greater expectations of political security would invest in 
building new institutions, as took place in Mendoza.  But San Juan’s governor can be re-elected, 
whereas Mendoza’s can not.  Political competition may be indeterminate (Remmer & Wibbels, 
2000) as San Juan had closer gubernatorial elections than Mendoza.  Moreover, the Peronist 
party dominated the executive and legislative branches of both provinces in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.   22
  A more fruitful comparative analysis would focus on how the differences in the political 
approaches of Mendoza and San Juan to the crises of the late 1980s shaped both the creation and 
effectiveness of institutions supportive of upgrading.  This section briefly shows how San Juan’s 
“depoliticization” approach induced new investment but impeded upgrading.  It then details how 
Mendoza’s “participatory restructuring” approach resulted in the gradual construction of public-
private institutions that helped firms improve their skills and knowledge and aided the 
government and the relevant associations form new lines of communication and coordination.     
IVa.  Diverging Political Approaches to Reform in San Juan and Mendoza 
San Juan  
  San Juan’s approach toward the wine industry was based largely on the use of arm’s-
length economic incentives implemented by a government with little consultation of major socio-
economic groups.  Three major policy areas reveal this pattern.   First, by the mid-1980s the 
provincial state owned winery, Cavic, which supported thousands of small grape producers, was 
insolvent.  The government quickly elected to sell it to local investors.  The resulting company 
soon collapsed, and the government was forced to take it over and liquidate it.   
  Second, San Juan utilized a federally supported tax incentive program for small, poorer 
provinces as the principal policy to improve agribusiness, especially for the wine sector.  San 
Juan joined three other provinces (not including Mendoza) in this program in 1983.  By 1990 it 
had gained about 290 projects in manufacturing and agriculture at a fiscal cost of about $1.2 
billion.  After the program was revised to focus on agriculture and tourism projects, San Juan 
again elected to participate actively.  In the 1990s, it gained over $1 billion in direct investment 
from over 400 projects, about half of which were fully or partially dedicated to wine and grape 
production.  Some estimate that these programs cost Mendoza $100-200 million per year in   23
production output from diverted investments.
17   Approximately 193 firms were committed to 
investing into the industry, including upgrading over 14,000 hectares, about half of which have 
been for the development of grapes for fine wine (Allub, 1996; Borsani, 2001).   
  As argued by both independent researchers (Allub, 1996; Rofman, 1999) as well as the 
Ministry of Economy of San Juan itself (Gobierno de San Juan, 2004), reliance on this program 
as the framework for wine sector restructuring brought little upgrading and increasingly 
antagonized and fragmented the stakeholder groups of the value chain.  The main beneficiaries 
were large firms with rather short-term interests that had limited knowledge or capacities in 
undertaking the time-consuming experiments for transforming vineyards and developing a broad 
base of capable grape suppliers.  Small grape producers and wineries and their respective trade 
associations grew increasingly disillusioned with the policy, the government, and the large 
wineries (Rofman 1999).   At the same time, there were no few helpful support programs or 
institutions.   
  Third, San Juan failed several times to build new public-private institutions to help 
regulate and promote the development of the wine sector.  Following damaging volatility of 
grape prices, the San Juan government signed but failed to enact an agreement in 1993-94 with 
Mendoza to build a new institution to help stabilize grape prizes and to share new policies 
toward the wine sector.  On three different occasions between 1989 and 1999, San Juan also 
attempted but failed to create a new provincial export agency.  On the one hand, the government 
was reluctant to share policy-making and resources with other actors, be they from Mendoza or 
provincial sectoral associations.  On the other hand, the government was satisfied that the 
existing regime of tax incentives provided sufficient support for inducing investment. 
Mendoza   24
  In contrast, the policy approach of Mendoza was based on empowering a wide variety of 
public and private actors to actively participate in resolving the crisis at hand and building new 
institutions for the broader restructuring of the agricultural sectors.  The first step came in 1987, 
when newly elected governor, Jose Octavio Bordon, and his allies confronted the collapse of the 
Mendoza state-owned winery, Giol, which was losing over $500,000 per month with a debt of 
over $35 million. Giol produced over 10% of the nation’s wine and processed over 15% of the 
provinces grapes from more than 4000 small and medium sized grape suppliers. The Bordon 
administration was wary of the poor privatization of Cavic in San Juan and was equally 
concerned about the unrest that restructuring Giol could set off among large business interests, 
labor unions, and the communities of its thousands of grape suppliers.  Hence, the administration 
aimed to transform Giol into a federation of cooperatives (Fecovita) as a way to initiate broader 
industry restructuring and forge compromises among the warring factions. 
  The government and the new Giol director, Eduardo Sancho (the former head of the 
Association of Wine Cooperatives) led a drive to incorporate stakeholders into the process while 
improving their organizational resources.  The new Giol board included three members 
appointed by the governor, three elected “by the people”, and one representing labor unions. 
(Paladino and Morales 1994a)  The government and Giol organized a large publicity and 
information dissemination campaign, regularly consulted with the labor unions and the trade 
associations, and organized over 500 community meetings that included representatives from all 
sides – the provincial and municipal governments, labor unions, civic associations, and trade 
associations.  At the same time, government and Giol officials encouraged small farmers and 
winemakers to organize themselves into cooperatives by offering new credit programs, technical 
and legal advice, the leasing of Giol wineries to coops at special rates, and purchase guarantees   25
as a transition policy.  By the end of 1988, nine new cooperative were formed, and within a few 
years the new Fecovita had 25 new cooperatives that incorporated over 1500 of the original 4000 
grape suppliers of Giol. (Paladino and Morales 1994a,b; Juri 1990) 
  Upgrading Fecovita and its members has been gradual.  Most the initial upgrading, as was 
typical for most firms, focused on new technology rather than linking new product standards 
with new production practices. (Walters 1999, p. 137-139)  But through regular review by its 
members and outside auditors, elected management adopted increasingly stringent operational 
and product standards as it diversified its product portfolio, modernized systems, and revamped 
its marketing.  Fecovita and its member cooperatives gradually lowered minimum purchase-
supply agreements, allowing all parties also to use the market as an additional disciplining 
device.  Upgrading support came from on-time payments at preferential prices and access to 
Fecovita’s pooled resources and services, especially its projects in R&D and training with new 
institutions that would emerge in the 1990s.  Fecovita helped members gain access to credit, 
markets, inputs, training and knowledge at low cost through both its combined bargaining power 
and its alliances with banks, domestic and international distributors, as well as public-private 
research and extension organizations in Mendoza, such as INTA, the Instituto Desarrollo Rural 
(IDR), and the agronomy faculty of the Universidad Nacional de Cuyo (Amendola, 2003).     
  The Fecovita experiment had three main impacts on Mendoza.  First, Fecovita soon 
became profitable, as improvements from grape growing to label management led it to expand 
both domestically and internationally in table and fine wine.
18  Second, the Fecovita experiment 
enhanced the diversity of wine and grape producers by reviving small producers and 
cooperatives.  During the 1990s, the number of cooperatives in the wine sector grew by about   26
30% to 50, which have over 4500 grape producers as members or dedicated suppliers.  About 
35% of the output of Mendoza cooperatives is focused on premium and super-premium wines.
19 
  Third, the Fecovita experiment appears to have launched effort by the government to 
create new policies and institutions with socioeconomic partners.  For instance, according to 
federal documents detailing the programs and institutions related to agriculture in every 
province, Mendoza developed over 75 programs and policies (from credits, to insurance to R&D, 
to health standards and pest prevention) in the 1990s that have directly and indirectly assisted 
firms in the wine sector.
20  Virtually all programs are jointly developed and administered by 
partnerships between the government and approximately 50 non-governmental organizations.  In 
contrast, San Juan’s relatively few support programs mostly come from the federal government 
and are managed mainly by a government office alone.  This change in policymaking and 
implementation may also partially explain why, in both absolute and per capita terms, Mendoza 
has many more civic organizations than in San Juan that have inclusive membership, have both 
internal and external funding sources, and produce non-exclusive benefits.  Scholars have shown 
that such organizational traits tend to improve information flows, professional ties, and policy 
responsiveness.
21 
  In short, the richness and effectiveness of Mendoza’s policy portfolio toward the wine 
industry is not a product of simply inherited associationalism or state capacities.  Rather, it 
should be seen as part of the gradual construction of a dense public-private network of 
organizations that are pooling information and resources while improving their collective 
capacities to problem solve.  The Fecovita experience began a political strategy by Bordon and 
his allies (who led two more successive administrations) to gain the loyalty of small holders and 
renovate the relationships among the government and the wide variety business associations.  I   27
now turn to a more detailed analysis of how this approach to creating the most prominent public-
private institutions in Mendoza in the 1990s provided governance mechanisms that enhanced the 
upgrading capabilities for both firms and the government. 
IVb.  Experimenting with Public-Private Organizations 
  Mendoza’s approach to reform provided two mechanisms that linked the process of 
institution-building with the ability of the institutions to help solve the coordination and 
knowledge diffusion problems discussed earlier.  First, in confronting new strategic challenges, 
the government convened a variety of relevant associations to generate and jointly govern an 
institutional solution, for which it would provide much of the vital resources.  Second, 
representatives of the participating bodies would supervise institutional oversight and 
progressively engage in collective problem solving by regularly and jointly defining key 
constraints they faced, evaluating the outcomes of proposed solutions, and deciding on corrective 
measures or the next policy measures.  These two mechanisms helped: a) reshape the 
relationships among the government, the participating associations, their firms; b) the institutions 
improve knowledge and skills creation; and c) the public and private actors develop and 
implement new collective strategies. 
Embedding the government and recombining public-private ties 
  As Table 3 reveals, the most prominent institutions that contributed to upgrading in the 
wine sector in Mendoza were mainly charged with providing a variety “supply-side” services 
and resources to firms in a variety of sectors.  These institutions cut across the public and private 
domains in their membership, governance, funding, and missions.  The founding and 
restructuring of the institutions emerged mainly from the government convening relevant public 
and private actors to confront a new shock or strategic challenge. In turn, a variety of public   28
entities and sectoral associations jointly became responsible for the governance and resource 
support of the institutions.  For instance, in 1991 the federal government greatly decentralized 
and reduced the budgets of INTA’s regional centers.
22  With the aim of increasing and 
diversifying its sources of revenues and services, INTA Mendoza gradually expanded its sub-
regional centers and required that the new advisory councils and affiliated NGOs 
(“cooperadoras”) be composed of representatives from relevant government agencies (provincial 
and municipal), associations, firms, and educational institutions.  In 1992-93, Mendoza and San 
Juan experienced destructive winters that caused great volatility in grape prices and left 
thousands of SME producers devastated.  This crisis resulted in two major initiatives.  At the end 
of 1993, the two provinces signed agreements to help stabilize the wine and grape supplier 
markets and develop support policies.  Only Mendoza implemented the new regulations and 
institutions.  In 1994, the government and the major wine and grape producers associations 
created the Fondo Vitivinicola to oversee the new regulatory regime and use the proceeds of a 
new penalty for non-compliance to promote the wine industry and wine consumption.
23  In 1993-
94, the Mendoza government also launched a series of policies to help protect farmers from 
weather damage and aid them in vineyard restructuring.  The main institutional vehicle was the 
FTC, which coordinated with provincial banks and had regional advisory councils comprised of 
relevant municipalities.  IDR and ProMendoza grew out a need for services that INTA Mendoza 
and the federal export agency were not providing.  But because of a new federal law restricting 
provincial budgets, the Mendoza government had the associations take on part of responsibilities 
and resource demands.  
  The public-private nature of the formation and organization of these institutions overtime 
allowed each to become more embedded with one another and the associations of Mendoza and   29
act as bridges between the public and private domains as well as between the relevant 
associations.   Figures 3a and 3b depict this process in a simplified form.  Figure 3a shows the 
sparseness of ties in 1989 among the government and firms and associations of different parts of 
the value chain and zones.  Figure 3b shows how by the end of the 1990s the new institutions 
tied these different actors together.  By comparison, San Juan in 1990 and 2000 would look like 
the structure in Figure 3a.  (The appendix shows the resulting public-private network in more 
complex form, using membership and board data of the institutions and the associations. The 
bridging role of the new institutions is revealed in their relatively high “betweenness” scores. 
(Burt, 2001)  Note also how the creation of the new institutions improves structural position of 
several associations.) 
  This model of organization was gradually replicated at more micro levels. For instance, 
the Fondo Vitivinicola, INTA, IDR, and ProMendoza began opening offices in different zones 
with local partners, sitting on one another’s boards, and actively participating in such events as 
the wine evaluation committees mentioned in Section III.  The latter three institutions also began 
developing joint training and research programs and increasingly used network methods of 
training and R&D.  That is, these institutions provided services to groups of firms, forcing them 
to undertake joint projects in field experiments and collective problem solving.   
  The key innovation of these models was not simply providing public goods and services, 
but changing the socio-political landscape that could improve socio-economic outcomes.  First, 
by bringing in the different associations from inception, the government encouraged a greater 
sense of ownership for the new initiatives. Second, the multivalent (and often multisectoral) 
nature of institutions allowed the participants to pool and access new resources and information 
that each could not have individually, especially for previously marginalized associations of   30
producers from more backward zones of Mendoza.  (Padgett and Ansell 1993) Third, the 
institutions provided new social ties and channels of communication not only between the 
government and the associations but also between the associations themselves.  Firms and 
associations from different zones and also different sectors were now meeting regularly with one 
another.   
Participatory governance for institutional and firm upgrading  
  The new ties and institutions would be void of content without additional triggers. 
Besides gaining the rights of representation and often of electing executive boards, the 
participating members of each institution had to provide resources.  While the government often 
supplied the bulk of at least initial resources, the other members were obligated to provide 
complementary resources, if not financing then personnel, facilities, and information.  In turn, as 
access to new resources attracted, e.g., associations, to the table, each increasingly had a stake to 
ensure its own contributions were being well used.  Moreover, participants were charged with 
regularly defining the institution’s objectives and reviewing the results of actions taken.  In 
defining constraints and benchmarks, the participants drew on their own experiences and 
contacts, from the most advanced to the most backward.  In evaluating results, participants used 
not only benchmarks and comparisons with other relevant institutions, but also the feedback 
from their own constituents.  Participants could voice their proposals and grievances directly 
through the board and indirectly to the government, which was continually interested in building 
its new cross-sectoral and cross-regional coalition. 
  The combination of rules of inclusion and participatory governance brought forth both 
collective problem solving and mutual monitoring that pushed the institutions to gradually 
provide a scale and scope of services that no association could do alone and most provinces   31
lacked.  For instance, INTA Mendoza and later IDR pioneered new information resources, such 
as detailed mappings of the micro-climates for grapes and other agricultural products.  They and 
ProMendoza also developed data bases on best practices (internationally and sub-regionally), 
harvests, and product markets, training programs for different sectors, zones, and segments of the 
value chain, as well as teams of experienced consultants.  By the end of the 1990s, Mendoza had 
amassed an enviable set of upgrading resources.  There were seven times more INTA employees 
working on viticulture issues full time in Mendoza than in San Juan, a figure disproportional to 
the differences in the size of the sectors or the number of EEAs.  ProMendoza had helped almost 
1000 firms from various sectors participate in international trade fairs, and maintained an annual 
budget of about $2 million, comparable to the budget of the Argentine national export promotion 
agency, (ExportAr).  The FTC had provided credit supports of over $50 million dollars for about 
5000 firms. In contrast, Argentina historically lacked SME financing programs and did not even 
have an SME support agency until 1998 (McDermott 2000). 
  These constellations of resources came in part from the ability of the institutions to access 
and recombine the contributions of their members.  Consulting and R&D contracts with the most 
elite firms brought revenue streams that could subsidize training and research programs for more 
backward firms.  Standards, practices, and experiences from one zone or one sector could be 
diffused and reengineered for others.  But upgrading through scope, adaptation, and diffusion 
was also the gradual by-product of the members to monitor one another and push the institutions 
to take greater concern for their own needs. 
  For instance, in the early 1990s INTA launched a national program, Cambio Rural (CR), 
which mimicked the network learning model that the elite firms in the Primera Zona had created 
with their Grupos CREA.  CR was subsidized and adapted by INTA for producers from more   32
backward regions.  But CR in Mendoza had limited initial success.  Drawing on feedback from 
the CR participants and its council members, INTA Mendoza adapted the program by 
reorganizing the composition of the learning groups and customizing methods to different 
regions.  Around the same time, when the federal government elected not to renew CR, the 
Mendoza government stepped in to cover some of the costs.  By the end of the 1990s, CR in 
Mendoza had some of the best participation and cost-benefit rates in the country and far better 
than in San Juan.
24 (Cheppi, 2000; Lattuada, 2000)  INTA Mendoza’s dependency on multiple 
constituencies both forced and enabled it to gradually adapt programs and build new joint 
projects with firms and other institutions (e.g., FECOVITA, IDR, the universities).  Its testing 
labs were being used with the elite firms as well as cooperatives; it began documenting and 
teaching practices from the most advanced form of computer monitored drip-watering to 
Montenegro’s innovative use of the orthogonal vine training systems, mentioned in Section III.  
In turn, INTA in Mendoza was able to overcome the historical criticism of the national INTA 
system – that its bureaucratic lethargy made its knowledge base and technology too backward for 
the advanced firms and too advanced for the small, weak producers.  (Casaburi 1999) 
  ProMendoza, IDR, the FTC, and the Fondo Vitivinicola also soon became the focus of 
criticism that they were too focused on the needs of only a few constituents.  In response, the 
government opened a network of regional offices in the late 1990s to house local branches of 
IDR, ProMendoza, the FTC, ISCAMEN (the phitosanitary agency), and the provincial statistical 
office.  The institutions also worked on expanding their services.  ProMendoza built new data 
bases and promotional activities to include over 40 foreign markets for both agricultural and 
manufacturing products.  It also organized annual tours for foreign journalists to visit 
winemakers directly from a variety of zones, not just the better-known firms.  IDR began to   33
collaborate with INTA, INV (the national wine regulatory agency), and relevant associations to 
deliver timely information on international and domestic harvests and market prices.  IDR and 
INTA signed agreements with ISCAMEN for joint projects on data collection in the more 
backward zones and develop new food safety and pest prevention regulations that better 
addressed Mendoza’s diversity of micro-climates and agricultural products.  The FTC 
reorganized itself to work more closely with local banks and relevant associations to reduce 
approval time, codify new forms of loan security, and help finance a greater number of small 
firms from more backward zones for grape harvests and vineyard conversion. (Salvarredi, 2001) 
  The presence of multiple, related institutions also allowed participants to change alliances 
and force competition.  For instance, in 2001, Bodegas de Argentina, the association of the 
largest and most refined wineries, withdrew its membership from the Fondo de Vitivinicola after 
continued complaints with the Fondo’s management and promotional campaigns.  In turn, 
Bodegas created its own foundation, Wines of Argentina, to develop and implement international 
marketing campaigns for Argentine wine, often in collaboration with ProMendoza.  The Fondo 
has since revamped its domestic marketing campaign. 
  As the different forms of multiparty governance brought pressure and changes to the 
institutions, the institutions themselves were forced to bring pressure upon their clients.  That is, 
institutions like ProMendoza, IDR, and INTA began to use international and locally developed 
standards of products and processes not only to benchmark clients but also to restrict their access 
to certain programs.  For instance, ProMendoza realized that unprepared Mendoza firms were 
soiling the reputation of commercial delegations as well as wasting limited resources.  In turn, 
ProMendoza developed a system to evaluate whether a firm joining a trade delegation has the 
capabilities to communicate specific commercial, product, and process information to relevant   34
international buyers and journalists.  Before allowing firms to access more sophisticated R&D 
and extension programs, INTA performs systematic evaluations of a firm’s processes and 
products and then places the firm in its relevant cohort.  
  This use of standards and diagnostics helps upgrading by exposing the competitive 
weaknesses in client firms.  But when combined with the feedback mechanisms, it also has 
revealed weaknesses in the support system of the institutions themselves.  That is, the institutions 
and the participating associations began to learn where training was needed to help firms 
overcome the diagnosed constraints.  As a result, IDR and ProMendoza expanded services from 
data collection to training seminars and benchmarking distinct parts of the firm’s value chain.  
They also amassed information on training resources at other institutions that they went beyond 
their own capacities.  INTA as well developed multi-stage extension services that gradually 
exposed firms to increasingly complex standards and technologies.  
Overlapping ties and deliberative forums for improving public policy and collective action 
  The overlapping ties and participatory governance process in one institutional or policy 
domain equally led to collective action solutions that gave rise to institutional changes in other 
domains.  On the one hand, improvements in older, more archaic institutions emerged from their 
participation in new advisory councils and upgrading projects.  For instance, by the late 1990s, 
the two major Mendoza universities, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo (UNC) and Universidad 
Maza, had new or vastly expanded degree programs in enology and viticulture;  UNC was also 
for the first time undertaking applied agronomy research with firms.
25   These changes in part 
grew out of responding to specific demands and market information revealed via the universities’ 
participation in and joint research projects with INTA and IDR.   ISCAMEN, the Mendoza 
government’s food safety regulator, also sits on the boards of INTA and IDR.  It created new   35
crop protection and anti-pest prevention systems from joint data collection and field testing 
projects with INTA and IDR. 
  On the other hand, the institutionalization of collective problem solving and evaluation 
gradually turned project and council meetings into deliberative forums, in which the participants 
increasingly identified common strategic needs in other functional areas of upgrading.  The 
creation of IDR and ProMendoza emerged in part from ongoing debates in INTA Mendoza and 
the Fondo Vitvinicola about whether these institutions could handle the increasingly diverse 
demands from firms and their associations.  At the same time, an agreement between the 
provincial and federal governments on budget reforms restricted the hiring of new public 
employees.  What became IDR was actually first a small team of agronomists and economists 
financed via a contract between the Mendoza Ministry of Economy and INTA Mendoza.   
ProMendoza started as a joint project between the Ministry and the Bolsa de Comercio to 
evaluate export opportunities for provincial firms.  As the teams passed their first hurdles, the 
institutions were formalized and other relevant associations were brought on board.  A similar 
process spawned the creation of ITU, a public-private university offering a three year technical 
degree in management, and of IDIT, a public-private institution for applied operations research 
in engineering and manufacturing.
26   
The different governing councils also became repositories of grievances and forums of 
negotiations among representatives of the government and the diverse interest groups over core, 
controversial regulatory issues.  Laws on the protection of contracting rights for wine and grape 
suppliers, on the securitization of the grape market, on government subsidized hazard insurance 
for small producers, and on the aforementioned 1993 penalties to limit volatility in the wholesale 
wine and grape markets divided firms bitterly, especially those from more backward and more   36
advanced zones.  In the 1980s, the government would have either ignored such disputes or 
delivered patronage to the most powerful and well organized group.  But in the 1990s, the 
participatory restructuring approach had not only improved the balance of power between 
relevant associations but also had provided them with a greater variety and frequency of 
deliberative forums.  Regular and incremental changes in the above laws were realized (IDR 
2001) because the public and private participants were learning how to monitor one another in 
other areas, had established multiple lines of communication, were increasingly well informed 
about market trends and one another’s positions, and found that compromises in one sphere 
could lead to rewards in others over time. 
  The constellation of overlapping ties and forums for structured deliberations would aid 
the associations and the government to formulate more complex collective actions and policy 
changes that reached beyond the province.  For instance, the INV (Instituto Nacional de 
Vitivinicola) is the federal agency regulating the wine industry and was historically a symbol of 
government incompetence and patronage.  The Mendozans led negotiations with the federal 
government in 1995-96 to create a new Interprovincial Consultative Council that included seven 
representatives of the wine and mosto (a natural sweetener from grapes) value chain and 
effectively decentralized its decision-making process (Azpiazu & Basualdo, 2003).  By 
embedding the INV more deeply into the region (including bringing INV representatives onto 
other advisory councils) and carefully using its collective political capital, the Mendoza actors 
were able to secure improvements in the INV’s technical capabilities and even expand its 
mission to include such issues as certifying DOC standards.  Similarly, the Mendoza government 
and ProMendoza have been active in shaping Argentine trade negotiations with the Mercosur   37
and the EU and has taken the lead to appoint Argentina’s representatives on specific international 
bodies that impact trade in wine, mosto, and grapes. 
  These experiences in identifying common constraints and formulating joint strategic 
responses laid the groundwork for the effort to replicate the model on a national scale via the 
creation of the Ley Pevi and its governing body, COVIAR, which were mentioned in the 
beginning of this article.  As Mendoza gained a foothold in the key world wine markets, the 
institutional participants increasingly realized that their sustained international competitiveness 
demanded upgrading and resources that went beyond their own capacities.
27  These discussions 
converged in 2000 at a series of meetings of the advisory council of the EEA Mendoza that 
decided to initiate a plan develop a 20 year strategy.  The council formed executive and technical 
teams composed of members of its representative institutions and associations as well as other 
key actors not on the council.  With the Fondo Vitvinicola covering most of the overhead costs, 
the technical team benchmarked Argentine firms, products and policies against those of such 
countries as Chile and Australia, and the executive team began a campaign to gain support 
among political and industry leaders within and outside of Mendoza.  Similar to the Fecovita 
experiment, the teams organized a series of workshops over an 18 month period in the 
winemaking regions of Argentina to solicit input from, explain their strategy to, and build a 
broad coalition with relevant political and professional groups.   
  The Ley Pevi had three fundamental provisions.  First, it mapped out a national policy to 
promote export objectives via an expanded form of the Mendoza model across the relevant 
provinces – forging a network of public and private institutions to improve the capacity and 
strategic use of human, material, and knowledge resources.  Second, in order to enhance 
autonomy, avoid backlashes from other interest groups, and increase the incentives of   38
stakeholders, the additional funding would come from a new tax on the sales of wine products.  
Third, the Ley Pevi and all its components would be governed by a new non-profit, non-state 
entity, COVIAR, whose 12 member executive and advisory boards would be composed, again in 
the Mendoza style, by representatives of the federal and relevant provincial governments as well 
as the leading wine and grape producer associations.   
Concluding Remarks 
This article has attempted to offer a political constructionist view of the emergence of a society’s 
innovative capacities to upgrade by comparing the evolution of the wine industries in San Juan 
and Mendoza, namely the latter’s ability pioneer upgrading in the production of fine wine 
exports during the 1990s.  The comparison’s cross-sectional and longitudinal dimensions were 
able to control and thus reveal the limited individual explanatory power of such a priori 
structural factors as natural resource, knowledge, and economic endowments, social capital, 
commercial law, and provincial electoral institutions.  Rather, the article has argued that the 
different restructuring paths of San Juan and Mendoza is largely a product of the different 
political approaches to reform the provinces chose to confront a shared economic crisis in the 
late 1980s.  San Juan’s weak upgrading in the 1990s is rooted in its “depoliticization approach” 
that emphasized the use of arm’s length economic incentives designed and imposed on the 
market by a government relatively insulated from society.  In contrast, Mendoza’s “participatory 
restructuring approach” helped improve upgrading capabilities and reshape the relationships 
among the government and relevant sectoral associations through the construction of new public-
private institutions.  This process rested on two key mechanisms: 1) in confronting new strategic 
challenges, the government convened and empowered a variety of relevant associations to 
generate and jointly govern an institutional solution; 2) representatives of the participating bodies   39
would supervise institutional oversight and progressively engage in collective problem solving 
by regularly and jointly defining key constraints they faced, evaluating the outcomes of proposed 
solutions, and deciding on corrective measures or the next policy measures.   
  As with many complex industries, creating the innovative capacities for the wine industry 
is a dual problem of breaking old practices as well as getting the government and the diverse, 
often conflicting groups in the value chain to collaborate in previously unimagined ways.  Some 
Mendoza firms and their attendant business associations did recognize that upgrading cut across 
firm boundaries, and initially responded with efforts to build new supply networks and new 
forums for social learning.  As much as these efforts helped, they were also self-limiting.  The 
very diversity of skills and experience that can accelerate new knowledge creation can also 
present barriers to collaboration.  Decentralized, voluntaristic attempts at coordination and 
collaboration can lead to fragmentation of an industry, especially when diversity is coupled with 
a history of distrust, false starts, regional biases as well as resource and skill inequalities. 
  The participatory restructuring approach helped Mendoza gradually overcome these 
barriers and sustain broad base improvements at both the firm and institutional levels in three 
important ways.  First, the inclusionary principles of policymaking and institutional construction 
provided economic and political incentives for previously dispersed actors to come to the table 
and potentially forge new social and economic ties.  Second, the focus on collective problem 
solving in governance and services through iterative deliberations about priorities and the 
evaluation of remedies allowed the public and private participants to begin to share knowledge 
and resources, to learn how to monitor one another, and collaborate in new ways.  Third, the 
participants were able to learn how to improve both government policy and firm practices as well 
identify new areas of common problems for subsequent institutional innovations.    40
  My emphasis on the determining impact of different political approaches is an attempt to 
contribute to the growing attention scholars of economic development and institutional change 
are placing on the role of process variables.
28  For instance, the aforementioned rules of inclusion 
and participatory governance are proposed conditions under which government can experiment 
with new industrial policies (Rodrik 2004), institutions will be horizontally embedded (Montero 
2003), and public-private institutions will facilitate joint action for the creation of new innovative 
capacities (Schmitz 2004, Giuliani et al. 2005, Perez-Aleman 2005).  They are also the 
mechanisms that help specify how the recombination of existing social and political resources 
can inform the substance and sustainability of institutional change.  (Thelen 2003; Hirst 1994) 
  The proposed framework, in turn, invites further examination about the origins, 
sustainability, and replication of development institutions in two important ways.  First, it 
suggests researchers pay closer attention to the ways broader socio-political struggles promote 
and inhibit the ability of governments to forge new public-private institutions with a variety of 
stakeholder groups, particularly during periods of crisis.  For instance, the literature on 
federalism and party systems in developing countries often emphasizes the determining impact 
of optimal market preserving and financial incentives. (Weingast 1995)  But this literature also 
shows how ongoing attempts to manipulate and control the given federalist and party systems 
creates great variation in policies at the subnational level.  (Falleti, 2005; Guinazu, 2003; 
Levitsky, 2003; Montero & Samuels, 2004)  At the same time, Doner et al. (2005) have proposed 
a framework of systemic vulnerabilities, in which a particular combination of international and 
domestic political forces give countries greater incentives to invest in innovative capacities.  In 
turn, by uniting these literatures with a focus on the experimental processes of policy reform and 
institution building, one can better identify the broader socio-political conditions that give rise to   41
politicians adopting depoliticization or participatory restructuring approaches at subnational and 
national levels. 
  Second, the evidence here suggests that the principles of participatory restructuring can 
help overcome common barriers to sustainability and replication of local institutional 
innovations – large firms, especially MNCs, limiting access to new markets and knowledge 
(Schmitz and Humphries 2004; Gereffi and Sturgeon 2005) and poor histories of coordination 
among business associations, provincial, and national governments.  (Ostrom 1999; Schneider 
2004; Levitsky 2003)  The creation of multiple public-private institutions as both receptors and 
promoters of new innovative capacities helps keep any one particular set of firms from becoming 
the sole “gatekeepers” of knowledge and resources (Schmitz and Nadvi 1999) and from 
accumulating the disproportionate economic power that would reverse expansion of innovative 
networks. (Farrell and Knight 2003)  At the same time, the rules of inclusion and participatory 
governance can improve the ability of both public and private actors to monitor and learn from 
one another.  For instance, despite changes in directors, government administrations, and 
political coalitions, the Mendoza institutions continue to be stable and self-adapting, something 
rather unusual for Argentina (Levitsky et al., forthcoming).  Moreover, San Juan is witnessing 
significant change in the behavior of its government and relevant wine sector associations 
through greater coordination INTA’s regional center, their participation in Coviar, the recent 
inclusion of some San Juan firms in ProMendoza’s export promotional programs.  The 
government has openly criticized the old approach of tax incentives and advocated the creation 
of new public-private institutional resources for training, R&D, and export promotion. 
(Ministerio de Economia de San Juan 2003)  Leading grape producers have also left the old 
sectoral association to form a new one and actively participate in Coviar.    42
  In sum, economic upgrading is determined not simply on the presence of certain 
institutions but especially how they are constructed and governed.  As researchers on 
development readdress the roles of industrial policy (Rodrik (2004), clusters (Schmitz 2004), 
multinationals (Gereffi et al. 2005), and business associations (Schneider 2004), they may be 
better able to identify the political conditions of development by incorporating the literature on 
institutional change (Thelen 2003) and participatory governance (Fung & Wright 2001; Sabel 
1994.  43
Figures 1a & 1b:  The Growth of Argentine Wine Exports (by Volume and Value) 
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Table 1.  Scores for Argentine and Chilean Wines by Wine Spectator 
 
Argentina Distribution of Ratings Per Year 
Year  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mean  81 81 82 81 81 79 84 84 84 85 84 
Median  82 82 83 81 82 78.5  84 84 84 85 85 
SD  4.4 4.4 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.7 
Observations  27 33 33 65 102  60 145  146  137  194  79 
Minimum  73 73 74 71 61 64 73 72 71 70 75 
Maximum  89 89 91 92 92 87 93 92 92 95 89 
             
             
Chile Distribution of Ratings Per Year 
Year  1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mean  82 83 83 83 82 83 83 83 83 84 84 
Median  83 83 84 84 82 83 83 83 83 84 84 
SD  5.2 3.7 4.1 3.6 4.3 4  4.3 4.3 4.8 3.9 3.5 
Observations  112 146 200 257 269 308 310 340 326 287 155 
Minimum  55 71 62 69 55 70 71 69 60 76 76 
Maximum  91 90 90 92 91 91 92 94 95 93 91 
Note: Wines are rated on 100 point scale. Scores over 90 are considered excellent and over 85 
very good. 
 
Figure 2.  Weighted Scores for Argentine and Chilean Wines (Wine Spectator) 
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Note: Scores were weighted by multiplying the number of wines in a particular range (e.g., 80-
84, 85-99, 90-94, etc.) by a grade factor given to the range (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc.).   45
Tables 2a & 2b.  Comparing Mendoza and San Juan  
 
Table 2a.  Comparative Wine, Grape, and Industry Data 
   Year Mendoza  San  Juan 
Winemaking/ 
ind output  1994 21.10%  26.50% 
Mfg 
Industry/GDP  1993 18.96%  24.69% 
Agro/GDP  1993 8.47%  11.11% 
1990 66.55%  24.88%  Province’s 
Share of 
National Wine 
Production  2000 61.07%  31.06% 
1990 69.74%  21.94%  Province’s 
Share of 
Grapevine Area  2001 70.08%  22.51% 
Province’s 
Share of Wine 
Exports 
Ave. 2000-
03  90.62% 6.40% 
Sources: INV; Consejo Federal de Inversiones, Argentina.  
 
 
Table 2b.  Comparative Economic, Social, and Political Data 
  Mendoza San  Juan  Argentina 
Population( 2000)  1,607,618 578,504  37,074,032 
GDP (Millions USD, 1993)  $6,925   $2,266   236,505 
GDP/Capita (1993)  $7,878   $4,571   $7,254 
Growth of GDP (1993-00)  1.17% 1.04%  -- 
Gini Coeff (2000)  0.375 0.378  0.491 
Human Development Index (2000)  0.747 0.736  0.854 
Impact of Coparticipation (1997)  65.10% 56.50%  -- 
Deficit/GDP (1999)  3.40 2.30  1.89 
Current Account Balance (Ave. 1996-98)  -5% 4%  -- 
Debt Service /Current Revenues (Ave. 1993-99)  14.54 7.27  20.21 
Unemployment Rate (Ave. 1993-99)  5.90% 8.50%  13.93% 
No. of 4 yr.Terms Governor Can Serve  One Two  n/a 
Electoral Competition Score* (1991)  2.53 20.64  -- 
Electoral Competition Score* (1995)  22.54 19.28  n/a 
No. of NGOs/1000 inhabitants**  2.3 2.18  -- 
No. of Total Cooperatives (1989)  397 333  -- 
No. of Agricultural Cooperatives (1989)  64 79  -- 
Crimes against property per 1000 
inhabitants***  42.6 25.8  -- 
Notes: * - Measured as the margin of victory in the gubernatorial elections. See Remmer and 
Wibbels (2000) and Wibbels (2005). ** - See Fiel (2003) and GADIS (2004). *** - See Fiel 
(2003).   46
Table 3.  Leading Upgrading Support Institutions in Mendoza in the 1990s 
 
Institution Year  of 
creation or 
restructuring 
Governing 
Members 
Activities Resources  Legal  Form 
INTA Cuyo  1991  Govts of S Juan 
& Mza, 9 Agro 
Ass’ns, 2 Nat’l 
Univ’s 
Regional 
development plan, 
oversee budgets & 
activities of EEAs 
National & 
provincial 
budgets 
1 of 15 semi-
autonomous 
Regional 
Centers; 
Federal body in 
Sec. of Agro. 
INTA EEAs  1991  Gov’t  of  Mza, 
Munis. Agro 
Ass’ns, Nat’l   
and Prov’l 
Institutes and 
Univ’s 
R&D (inputs, 
plants, tech), 
extension training, 
consulting 
Half – nat’l   
budget (salaries 
& overhead); 
Half – services, 
alliances, gov’t 
Mza, 
cooperadoras 
Part of INTA 
Cuyo; 4 in 
Mza, 1 in SJ; 
Each has 1-4 
AERs 
Fondo 
Vitivinicola 
1993-94 Gov’t  Mza,  11 
wine/grape 
Ass’ns 
Oversees new 
wine regulations,   
promotes wine 
industry/marketing 
Tax on firms 
from over 
produc’n of wine 
Public, non-
state, non-
profit entity.  
Fondo para la 
Transformacion 
y el 
Crecimiento 
(FTC)  
1993-94 Min.  of 
Economy, 
Regional 
advisory 
councils 
Subsidized loans 
and credit 
guarantees to 
SMEs for tech 
against extreme 
weather & for 
grape conversion 
Self-financing; 
initial capital 
from 
privatization of 
gas & oil 
reserves 
Independent 
legal entity 
under authority 
of governor 
Instituto 
Desarrollo 
Rural (IDR) 
1994-95  36 founders – 
INTA Cuyo, 
Govt Mza, 
ISCAMEN, 2 
peak ass’ns, 
various agro 
sectoral ass’ns 
Technical info 
collection & 
dissemination; 
Data base mgmt; 
R&D, training, 
consulting 
Mza Gov’t; 
services; gradual 
increase of fees 
from member 
ass’ns 
Non-profit 
Foundation; 
with oversight 
by Min of 
Economy 
Pro Mendoza  1995-96  Gov’t  Mza,  3 
peak business 
associations 
Export promotion 
– organize fairs, 
delegations, 
strategic 
information, 
training 
Gov’t Mza; Peak 
ass’ns; services 
Non-profit 
Foundation 
Abbreviations: INTA – Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria; EEA – Estaciones 
Experimentales (Sub-regional centers); Mza – Mendoza; ISCAMEN – Instituto de Sanidad y 
Calidad Agropecuaria Mendoza; Cooperadors – Non-profit NGOs.   47
Figure 3a: Policymaking and strategic ties in the Mendoza Wine Industry, 1989 
 
 
 
NB.  Guide for both Figures 3a and 3b: 
Solid black circles represent firms in different regions in Mendoza.  Each region has its main 
wine business association, as shown by large white arrow. Dashed lines represent weaker links of 
contracting or communication than solid lines.  Solid arrows denote membership or board 
participation in relevant associations and institutions. 
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Figure 3b: Policymaking and strategic ties in the Mendoza Wine Industry, 2000 
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Appendix 
Figures A-1 and A-2 are generated 2001 using institutional membership (affiliation) and board 
data processed with the network program, UCINET.  The data set is a matrix of 325 unique 
associations and institutions (and about 20 firms) linked to the wine and grape sectors.  The lines 
denote a board or membership connection between associations or institutions.  To create Figure 
A-1, I simply removed the institutions (INTA Mza, IDR, ProMendoza, etc.) that were 
nonexistent at the time.  This allows one to systematically see the ways the new public-private 
institutions bridged communities and indeed strengthened the secondary position of sectoral 
associations.  Figure A-1 reveals a few “ghettos” of some associations; the large majority of 
associations and institutions are isolates (lined on the left) and not shown by the program. Figure 
A-2 shows Mendoza in 2001.  The new institutions are labeled and have box shaped nodes.  
Table A-1 shows the 20 largest betweeness statistics form 2001 data.  This shows that the new 
institutions, along with some government agencies, the university, and the two peak associations, 
play the most important bridging or “brokering” roles in the industry and province. (See Burt 
1992; Safford 2004.) 
 
Figure A-1.  The Mendoza Wine Industry and Policymaking, 1989 
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Figure A-2.  The Mendoza Wine Industry and Policymaking, 2001 
 
 
 
Table A-1.  Largest Betweeness Scores, Mendoza 2001. 
 
   FEM-peak 
ass'n 
IDITS  UCIM-
peak 
assn 
Fecovita  INTA Mza  IDR  Wines 
of Arg 
INTA 
Junin 
(EEA) 
Betweenness 20718.12 18107.32 13556.21  12894.66 8431.386719 8041.07 5469.87 4148.68 
nBetweenness 39.59  34.6  25.91 24.64 16.11  15.37  10.45  7.93 
 
INTA 
Rama 
Caida 
(EEA) 
INTA S. 
Juan 
ProMza  INTA 
Cuyo 
Ctr 
Agro'ts 
- South 
Zone 
Fondo 
Viti 
Bod. 
Arg 
(elites) 
Univ Natl 
Cuyo 
Govt Mza  Assn 
Vinas 
Mza 
3734.21 3429.17  2962.12 2805.07 2498.73 1363.44 1353.71 1205.5 969.71  943.64 
7.14 6.55  5.66 5.36  4.78  2.61 2.59 2.3  1.85  1.8 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 On the indeterminate impact of FDI and export firms on upgrading see  (CEPAL, 2002; Cornelius & Kogut, 2003; 
Humphrey & Schmitz, 2004). See, for instance, on networks (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Saxenian, 
1994), social capital (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993), property rights (Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2000; 
North, 1990), state coherence and capacity (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Guillen, 2001), and on “industrial 
districts” or “clusters” (Herrigel, 1996; Humphrey et al., 2004; Locke, 1995; Piore & Sabel, 1984; Schmitz, 2004a, 
2004b). 
2 On the indeterminate impact of FDI and export firms on upgrading see  (CEPAL, 2002; Cornelius & Kogut, 2003; 
Humphrey & Schmitz, 2004). See, for instance, on networks (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Saxenian, 
1994), social capital (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993), property rights (Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2000; 
North, 1990), state coherence and capacity (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Guillen, 2001), and on “industrial 
districts” or “clusters” (Herrigel, 1996; Humphrey et al., 2004; Locke, 1995; Piore & Sabel, 1984; Schmitz, 2004a, 
2004b). 
3 This research was based on field work during 2003-2005 that utilized over 65 open-ended interviews with relevant 
managers, enologists, agronomists, and policymakers as well as current and historical data bases on relevant 
provincial and national policies, civic associations, and firms. 
4 Through the 1990s, Argentine exports accounted for only 10% of GDP.  Most exports were in commodities and 
low-value added, even in sectors such as leather goods where Argentina historically had comparative advantages 
and a well developed processing segment (CEPAL, 2002; Lugones, 2000) Guillen 2001. 
5 Over the last 20 years, there has been a decline in per capita wine consumption, increased consumption in fine 
wines (especially the four fighting), and intense competition from “New World” wine producing countries (e.g., 
USA, Chile, Australia) threatening traditional producers of Europe.  See Henderson et. al. (2004) and Bartlett 
(2001). 
6 For more on this strategy and the rise of Argentine export prices, see Cetrangulo  et. al. (2002); “La amenanza a las 
vinas chilenas,” El Mercurio, Nov. 2, 2005; and the lengthy annual reviews of Argentine wines in Wine Spectator 
(November 15, 1995; December 15, 1997; March 24, 2003; November 30, 2004; November 30, 2005). 
7 Between 1980 and 1990, the number of vineyards fell by 31% and then another 29% until 2001; the amount of 
vineyard surface area fell by about 35% in the 1980s and then slightly declined in the 1990s (with eradication of 
vines being largely offset by new plantings).  As of 2001, vineyards with less than 25 has. still accounted for 92% of 
the number of vineyards and 60% of surface area. The figures are about the same for San Juan. 
8 See Walters (1999), Giuliani and Bell (2005), and Bartlett (2001).  In Australia, the top 3 firms account for 50% of 
exports; the top ten firms account for almost 20% of vineyard surface area. In Chile, the top 6 firms account for 
about 80% of exports. 
9 I draw here on a few studies which attempt to clarify the terrain of the principal fine wine companies, using 
different sets of data (Cetrangolo et al. 2002, Blazquez 2001, Ruiz & Vila 2003,  and Vila 2002). 
10 According to a 2003 survey of 400 wineries in Mendoza, only 4% have foreign investment and only about 6% are 
associated with or controlled by a diversified Argentine business group or corporation.  FDI estimates come from 
CEM (1999) and Nimo (2001). 
11 The calculations on surface area and high quality grapes are done by the author using the data provided by the 
INV.  See also Cetrangulo et. al (2002) , Bocco (2003), and “Cosecha 1999-2002,” La revista de la Bolsa, Nº 441, 
October 2002.  The figures on capabilities and exports of firms from the Zona Este are from a survey of 400 
wineries in Mendoza undertaken in 2003 by the Ministry of Economy of the government of Mendoza. 
12 Argentina ranks consistently low in measures of rule of law and property rights protection.  See: 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/index.html.  In an analysis of provincial business climate, 
measures of legal efficiency were similar between the two province, while Mendoza had a much higher number of 
crimes against property per 1000 inhabitants than San Juan. (FIEL 2003) 
13 This type of story was repeated to me on 10 different occasions. 
14  By the 1990s, San Juan has had five wine/grape sectoral associations, one economic federation, and one export 
association; Mendoza had six wine/grape sectoral associations, two economic chambers, and one export association. 
15 ACREA (Asociacion de Consrocios de Experimentación Agropecuaria) is an association that began decades 
earlier coordinating and promoting collective learning among farms in the Pampas regions – the regions of grain, 
cattle, and dairy.  The participants meet monthly at one of the member’s vineyards to address a common problem or 
strategic concern via the “live” example at the given vineyard.  There were no Grupos in San Juan, but between 
1990 and 1996 the number of Grupos grew from three to six, falling in the late 1990s back to three in Mendoza.   57
                                                                                                                                                               
16  The events in Mendoza, CODEVIN San Rafael (Zona Sur) in 1995 and CODEVIN de Zona Este in 1997,  grew 
rapidly from a few dozen samples to over 150 each within two to three years. San Juan firms created EVISAN in 
1997. It grew from 50 samples by 14 participating wineries in 1997 to over 102 samples by 29 wineries in 2004. 
17 Promoción industrial was started in 1973 and included San Juan in 1983 as the fourth beneficiary, in addition to 
the provinces of Catamarca, La Rioja, and San Luis.  This program appeared to have had a significant impact in 
manufacturing and agriculture expansion in San Juan.  Although partially suspended in 1987, President Menem 
renewed it, first in 1992 by decree and then in 1996 by law (Guinazu, 2003); (Heymann & Kosacoff, 2000; Zudaire, 
2001).  Its revised form focused on deferring about 75% of income taxes to the investor in agroindustrial and 
tourism projects.  Estimates put the federal fiscal cost at about $7 billion in the 1990s.   (Borsani, 2001; Consejo 
Empresario Mendocino, 1999) 
18 During 1988 and 1989, Bordon would appoint an outside auditing commission, spin-off periphery units (such as 
in fruit, bottling, distilling), and reduce employment from 3500 to about 300.  Also, seven coops purchased wineries 
and twelve leased them in the beginning.  Leverage was slashed and virtually all the new cooperatives paid back the 
special loans ahead of maturity.  By 2002 Fecovita had sales of over $54 million, 28% of which was exports.  More 
recent, it has emphasized improvements in packaging, bottling, and label management and expanding medium 
quality fine wine (e.g. Marcus James in the US). (Amendola, 2003) 
19 Fecovita now includes 32 cooperatives, commercializes over 80% of the wine made by its members, and each 
cooperative ranges from 20 to 120 members.  There was virtually now growth in the number of wine cooperatives in 
San Juan in the 1990s.  See Paladino and Morales (1994) and Juri (1990). By 2000, over 2500 grape producers in 
Mendoza were members of cooperatives, accounting for over 15% of total grape production in the province, and 
another 2000 producers are estimated to be dedicated suppliers of the cooperatives  (Amendola et al. 2003). 
20 The PROINDER program is administered by the Secretary of Agriculture of the federal government.  Each 
province had to submit documentation, following a standard format, during 2000-2003.  Policy areas include 
programs for the prevention and diminished impact of negative climatic shocks, such as sudden hail storms and 
freezes (including subsidized credits to SMEs for relevant equipment and a specialized monitoring system), 
subsidized credits for small and medium farmers for improvements in technology, water management, and grape 
conversion, programs in the research, tracking, and dissemination of best practices in the management, processes, 
and technologies of farms by every sub-region, continued tracking of the climate, soil qualities, fertilizer uses, and 
harvests in every sub-regions, and the expansion of the capabilities of the provinces phitosanitary regulator. 
21  See Locke (2001), Cohen and Rogers 1992, and GADIS (2004). According to the data from the UNDP/IDB civil 
society index in Argentina, by 2000, there were 419 such organizations in Mendoza and only 92 in San Juan.  As the 
UNDP notes in its analysis, these types of civic organizations, by virtue of the membership and services, tend to 
connect individuals from different backgrounds and sectors in new ways, are experimental in service development, 
and help pool various sources of information and resources for public access.  Moreover, chief among organizations 
in this classification are support organizations, especially those focus on economic development and social services.  
Whereas Mendoza has proportionally more organization linked to training, education, sciences, and SMEs, San Juan 
has many social, neighborhood, and sports clubs.  
22 INTA’s  budget was radically changed, as the federal government eliminated its primary stable source of funding, 
a 1.5% tax on agricultural exports, incorporating INTA’s funding into the general government budget.(Casaburi, 
1999)  The national Executive Committee includes representatives of the federal government, agricultural 
educational institutions, and the top agricultural producers’ associations.  INTA has gone through three 
reorganizations between 1991 and 2005.  For instance, from 1991 to 1997, the Cuyo center concerned only Mendoza 
and San Juan, and then from 1997 to 2004 this center included the provinces of of La Rioja and San Luis as well.  
Since 2005, the Center has returned to include on Mendoza and San Juan. 
23 By law, any firm that uses at least 20% of its input grapes for mosto (the natural juice sweetener) does not have to 
pay an annual, relatively small tariff to the Fondo. The Fondo Vitivinicola is financed from these tariffs and 
matching funds from the government of Mendoza.   
24 Within about 4 years the program boasted nationwide over 1900 groups of over 21,000 producers and a network 
of almost 200 full- and part-time field agents and consultants in many agro sectors. CR in Mendoza reached better 
than expected results. It claimed over 100 learning groups that accounted for about 1250 producers, while in San 
Juan it created only 19 groups of 133 producers. By 1996, about 350 grape growers were participating in CR 
Mendoza.  See Cheppi (2000) 
25 According to data of these two universities, the number of students and graduates in agronomy and enology 
degree programs increased by 50% between 1996 and 2001.   58
                                                                                                                                                               
26 The Instituto Tecnologico Universitario was founded in 1993 by the Mendoza government, Universidad Nacional 
de Cuyo, Universidad Tecnológica Nacional and two peak level Mendoza business associations to provide a three 
year technical degree in management and technology.  
27 This is based on interviews and documentation of the minutes of relevant meetings at INTA Cuyo. 
28 On Russia, see Woodruff (2000), Herrera (2005) and Johnson (2001), on China, see Huang (2003) and Oi (1992), 
On Brazil see Tendler (1997) and Montero (2002), on Germany see Herrigel (1996), and on Italy see Locke (1994) 
and Farrell and Knight (2003).  
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